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Abstract 
This paper uses a unique dataset of 120 regulatory events from five classes to test the relevance 
of the regulatory framework for cryptocurrency value. Time-series market-wide estimates and 
panel estimates for 300 individual coins and tokens show statistically and economically 
significant impact of anti-money laundering and issuance regulation. Tighter regulation and 
more active role of government decrease cryptocurrency prices, evidencing that potentially 
lower risks and wider adoption commonly attributed to the establishment of the regulatory 
framework do not compensate for respective efficiency and consumer utility losses. The market 
is generally efficient in reflecting regulatory information in cryptocurrency prices.  
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Introduction and Literature Review 
With the advent of blockchain technology in general and its most famous practical applications, 
cryptocurrencies, in particular, the issue of its regulation has been becoming increasingly 
relevant. Academics, policymakers, investors, and blockchain enthusiasts alike engage in the 
heated debate on what is the socially desirable level of cryptocurrency regulation. Some of the 
most vocal opponents, notably Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, call for a complete 
cryptocurrency ban (Costelloe, 2017), while others advocate for a more or less flexible 
regulatory framework (Grinberg, 2011; Bollen, 2013; Atzori, 2015). On the other side of the 
opinion spectrum, it is argued that cryptocurrencies should not be regulated at all (Davidson 
and Block, 2015; Swan, 2015). The overall relevance of cryptocurrency regulation is 
overwhelmingly supported by the fact that even the Bank for International Settlements 
periodically issues thematic articles on the topic (e.g., Bech and Garrat, 2017; Auer and 
Claessens, 2018). 
The heterogeneity of views on the issue and lack of consensus can be easily explained 
as cryptocurrencies present both significant technological advantages and sources of consumer 
value as well as notable and non-trivial challenges and concerns. As such, the potential 
consumer value of cryptocurrencies has been widely studied in terms of alternative money 
supply or payment service provision (Beer and Weber, 2015; Davidson and Block, 2015; White, 
2015) and as substitutes for legal services and property rights definition (Swan, 2015; 
Karamitsos, Papadaki and Al Barghuthi, 2018). At the same time, cryptocurrencies are well-
acknowledged tools used for tax evasion (Slattery, 2014), money laundering (Bryans, 2014), 
and illegal activity financing, with estimated 46% of Bitcoin transactions occurring in the grey 
sector of the economy (Foley, Karlsen and Putnins, 2019). Furthermore, significant market 
volatility and bubble-like behaviour (Fry, 2018) present risk concerns for individual investors 
and theoretically pose a systemic risk threat to the financial system as a whole. Finally, the 
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environmental impact of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies and the energy-intensive mining 
process essential for the functioning of the network has been cited as a potential source of 
negative externalities (Truby, 2018).  
The lack of the regulatory focus of theoretical and empirical research on 
cryptocurrencies has been highlighted in the early foundational papers in the field (Dwyer, 
2015). Recent systematic analyses of cryptocurrency-related academic sources still concede 
that the existing literature, particularly on regulatory issues, is rather limited, inconclusive and 
immature (Corbet et al., 2019). Overall, the participants of the cryptocurrency regulation debate 
can be classified into two broad stylised categories: “mainstream risk-averse regulation bulls” 
and “crypto-anarchist regulation bears”. Members of the first broad group generally estimate 
the expected gains associated with reduced volatility and increased adoption due to the 
establishment of the regulatory framework to exceed the potential efficiency losses (Grinberg, 
2011; Bollen, 2013; Bryans, 2014; Böhme et al., 2015; Auer and Claessens, 2018), while the 
representatives of the second group generally presume the opposite. Furthermore, the “crypto-
anarchists” tend to claim that government regulation of blockchain technologies and 
cryptocurrencies, in particular, contradicts the initial idea of decentralisation, blockchain-based 
payment networks being effectively a "real hedge" against potentially too intrusive government, 
while some regulatory measures, e.g. know-your-customer procedures, partially compromise 
essential technological solutions of blockchain such as pseudonymity. Ultimately, it is argued 
that blockchain technologies can facilitate sufficient substitutes for services currently 
monopolised by the government, both regarding money supply provision (Beer and Weber, 
2015; Davidson and Block, 2015; White, 2015) and contract enforcement, e.g. property rights 
definition (Atzori, 2015; Karamitsos, Papadaki and Al Barghuthi, 2018).  
Obviously, to discuss the impact of regulation on cryptocurrency value one should 
understand to which extent government action can influence the blockchain payment systems 
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in the first place. As cryptocurrencies implement various security solutions to make transaction 
tracking and the association between physical, legal and digital persons prohibitively hard, the 
question whether state regulation can, if desired so, effectively restrain blockchain payment 
systems is a valid and a non-trivial topic to investigate. It is also a relevant issue given the fact 
that while regulation is a predominantly national matter, cryptocurrencies are necessarily 
exterritorial (Auer and Claessens, 2018). For example, as there are multiple exchanges 
contributing to cryptocurrency price discovery with the same pairs traded in different 
jurisdictions (Brandvold et al., 2015), national exchange regulation might be extremely 
ineffective. Addressing these concerns, Hendrickson and Luther (2017) show that banning 
cryptocurrencies is feasible via the combined implementation of transaction policies and 
sufficiently harsh punishments for use. Therefore, regulation, at least theoretically, can have a 
significant impact on the consumer value of blockchain payment systems and, consequently, 
on the market prices of cryptocurrencies. Auer and Classens (2018) in a similar manner 
speculate that cryptocurrency regulation can be effective, especially if it is enforced 
internationally. 
The only existing article on the market response to cryptocurrency regulation (Auer and 
Claessens, 2018) considers Bitcoin price reaction to 151 different regulatory events from 
January, 2015 until June, 2018. It asserts that the market reacts positively to advancements in 
the establishment of cryptocurrency regulatory framework and to legal recognition of 
cryptocurrencies as special asset classes, while bans, use restrictions and treatment as securities 
trigger negative price movements (Auer and Classens, 2018), therefore providing some early 
evidence in favour of the balanced approach to cryptocurrency regulation. Nevertheless, Auer 
and Classens (2018) utilise solely the Bitcoin return to derive its conclusions, while it is an 
established fact in the event study methodology literature that, when possible, such research 
should be undertaken on an aggregated portfolio basis by computing exposures of assets to 
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various relatively homogeneous event classes (Brock and Warner, 1985; McKinlay, 1997). 
Some early event studies for the cryptocurrency market indeed resorted to inferences from 
single currency price movements due to data unavailability or high event specificity (see, for 
example, Civitarese (2018) for the event study on the impact of technological news on coin 
prices). However, since there are currently hundreds of cryptocurrencies being traded on the 
market, this approach has been successfully utilised in Corbet et al. (2017) and Shanaev et al. 
(in press) for monetary policy news announcements and 51% attacks. Notably, the portfolio 
approach and large samples (100 digital assets) has also allowed Corbet et al. (2017) to detect 
heterogeneities in price reactions to macroeconomic news – they show that while digital 
currencies are quite responsive to monetary policy announcements, protocols and dApps are 
not. The issue of heterogeneous crypto-asset price reactions to various shocks has also been 
reinforced by Ciaian and Rajcaniova (2018) for the case of macro-financial indicators (e.g. gold, 
currency and stock market benchmarks), finding that altcoins are more exposed to these factors 
than Bitcoin.  
The incorporation of the regulatory factor into the analysis of returns and risk exposures 
of this emerging asset class fills a considerable gap in the literature identified both by systematic 
literature analyses (Corbet et al., 2019) and by the recent empirical studies, showing little or no 
connection between cryptocurrency returns and established asset markets or risk factors (Corbet 
et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018; Liu, Tsyvinski and Wu, 2019; Wang et 
al., in press). In case of general political factors, the evidence in the literature is mixed and 
conditional on the utilised metric of political risk: in case of economic policy uncertainty, the 
spillovers into the cryptocurrency markets are negligible, and crypto-assets can be employed as 
diversifiers (Wang et al., in press), while for geopolitical risks, negative innovations lead to 
higher returns, implying the hedging potential of cryptocurrencies (Aysan et al., 2019). 
Therefore, it becomes even more relevant to study the influence of market-specific regulatory 
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risk on the market prices of cryptocurrencies. As discussed above, the event study methodology 
was shown to be successfully applicable to the analysis of cryptocurrency performance (Corbet 
et al., 2017; Civitarese, 2018; Shanaev et al., in press). The most challenging aspect of such 
analysis is the accurate identification of event classes, which, unlike in the case of 51% attacks, 
can prove itself challenging in the context of regulatory news and announcements. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Due to the lack of systematised secondary data on the issue of cryptocurrency regulation, the 
study has resorted to manual primary data collection from a range of reputed traditional media 
sources such as Bloomberg, Reuters, BBC and Financial Times. For the sample period from 1st 
January 2017 until 18th March 2019, an extensive sample of 120 regulation-related news events 
has been formed. Content analysis techniques have been applied to the qualitative data gathered 
and common themes have been identified using the analysis of keywords and collocations. Five 
main broad topics of government and international cryptocurrency regulation are established 
and all of the regulatory events are allocated among these five categories: anti-money 
laundering, exchange regulation, issuance regulation, risk concerns and state-backed issuance. 
Following Auer and Claessens (2018), each of the events then has been assigned a sentiment 
dynamic binary variable of either positive (+1) or negative (-1).  
Anti-money laundering facet of cryptocurrency regulation is mainly concerned with 
state and monetary authorities seeking to combat cryptocurrency-driven tax evasion and money 
laundering schemes and involves a wide mix of policy measures from cryptocurrency bans to 
tracking to official registration of cryptocurrency wallets. The negative (positive) dynamic here 
implies tightening (loosening) of the respective regulatory framework. 
Exchange regulation covers all policy measures regarding cryptocurrency exchanges. 
These institutions can be considered a narrow and vulnerable spot of the blockchain network, 
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as exchange operations are easier to track and influence, therefore exchange regulation might 
be seen as a first step in the restriction of cryptocurrency use. Related to this facet of 
cryptocurrency regulation, positive sentiment includes new exchange approval and laissez-faire 
attitude towards exchanges while negative dynamic means license withdrawal, business 
improvement orders or legal actions taken against exchange operations. Unlike Auer and 
Claessens (2018), who treat anti-money laundering and exchange regulation homogeneously, 
this study has enough event data to study these event classes separately.  
Issuance regulation consists of the policy implications of cryptocurrency finance and 
fundraising, most notably, initial coin offerings (ICOs), and the development of the legal status 
of cryptocurrencies as either financial assets, currencies or property. Here, ICO bans, tighter 
regulation of cryptocurrency funding, rejection of cryptocurrency-related ETFs and ETPs as 
well as legal recognition of cryptocurrencies as securities (making these assets subject to SEC 
regulation in the US) are interpreted as negative events while a generally hands-off approach to 
ICOs and approval of new cryptocurrency-backed financial instruments is considered positive. 
This definition of regulatory event class is consistent with Auer and Claessens (2018).  
Risk concerns revolve around the public expression of government officials' attitude 
towards investment qualities or social value of cryptocurrencies as well as their formal 
endorsement, criticism or investment advice. Regarding risk concerns, positive and negative 
attitudes towards various characteristics of cryptocurrencies contribute to positive and negative 
regulatory sentiment, respectively.  
Finally, state-backed issuance considers the development of sovereign coins, i.e. 
cryptocurrencies directly controllable by the monetary or state authorities of a particular country 
(Bech and Garratt, 2017). Here, successful development of state-backed coins or announcement 
of respective plans or projects is regarded as positive, and development halts, project rejections, 




Findings and Discussion 
Table 1 below lists the full sample of 120 regulatory events allocated among five categories 
and with sentiment dynamic binary variable assigned to them while also providing raw market 
return and cross-coin return volatility on the event day. Table 2 further below shows how these 
events are spread across themes and jurisdictions simultaneously. Contingency analysis has 
produced a Chi-squared statistic of 168.36 significant at 1%, implying that different countries 
focus on various facets of the cryptocurrency regulatory framework development. Even from 
the descriptive presentation of data, it can be seen that US, UK and Japan, three leading 
jurisdictions in terms of relevant news jointly providing 59 out of 120 sample regulatory events, 
are concerned with issuance regulation, anti-money laundering and exchange regulation, 
respectively, while other countries, such as Russia, Estonia, Iran, Venezuela and Marshall 
Islands focusing entirely on sovereign coin issuance.  
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Table 1. Full sample of regulatory events (01/01/2017 – 18/03/2019). 
Date Country Brief event description Regulatory event class Dynamic Market return Volatility 
11/03/2017 US SEC: Bitcoin ETF proposal rejected Issuance regulation Negative 6.67% 15.12% 
01/06/2017 China Chinese exchange allows cryptocurrency withdrawals, moratorium ends Exchange regulation Positive 8.17% 15.22% 
06/06/2017 Russia Putin meets Buterin, wants to create state-backed coin based on Ethereum State-backed issuance Positive 5.17% 16.25% 
26/07/2017 US SEC: ICOs must abide by federal securities' laws Issuance regulation Negative -1.28% 10.80% 
01/08/2017 Russia Banks start using Ethereum-based blockchain to process payments State-backed issuance Positive 1.68% 14.24% 
08/08/2017 Russia Russia plans and ICO of a state-backed cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Positive 4.47% 22.66% 
17/08/2017 Australia Australia plans to tighten AML crypto regulation Anti-money laundering Negative 1.90% 23.12% 
22/08/2017 Estonia State-backed "Estcoin" cryptocurrency proposed State-backed issuance Positive 3.61% 15.24% 
04/09/2017 China ICO ban Issuance regulation Negative -11.34% 31.92% 
07/09/2017 Estonia Mario Draghi criticises Estcoin State-backed issuance Negative 0.70% 41.18% 
08/09/2017 Russia Russia will regulate cryptocurrencies as securities  Anti-money laundering Negative -9.04% 11.63% 
14/09/2017 Russia Central Bank of Russia: Cryptocurrencies are not a good idea Risk concerns Negative -21.12% 46.62% 
15/09/2017 China Cryptocurrency exchanges ordered to wind down their operations Exchange regulation Negative 15.88% 15.68% 
29/09/2017 South Korea ICO ban  Issuance regulation Negative -1.34% 41.32% 
29/09/2017 Japan Japan: endorsement to 11 cryptocurrency exchanges Exchange regulation Positive -1.34% 41.32% 
10/10/2017 Russia CBR: Websites selling cryptocurrencies will be blocked Anti-money laundering Negative 1.14% 28.20% 
15/10/2017 UK FCA warns retail traders against cryptocurrencies Risk concerns Negative -1.68% 9.63% 
24/10/2017 Singapore Singapore is not planning to regulate cryptocurrencies Risk concerns Positive -1.67% 44.57% 
04/12/2017 UK UK: money laundering concerns Anti-money laundering Negative 4.06% 19.69% 
04/12/2017 UK Treasury considers Bitcoin regulation due to money laundering concerns Anti-money laundering Negative 4.06% 19.69% 
11/12/2017 US Bitcoin futures start trading on CBOE Issuance regulation Positive 11.32% 16.90% 
12/12/2017 US US regulators warn cryptocurrency investors of potential risks Risk concerns Negative 10.85% 16.67% 
13/12/2017 South Korea Plans to tax capital gains from cryptocurrency trading Risk concerns Negative -0.85% 17.29% 
14/12/2017 UK FCA sees no systematic risk in bitcoin and no need to regulate it Risk concerns Positive 9.44% 16.67% 
16/12/2017 South Korea North Korea hacking South Korean cryptocurrency exchanges Anti-money laundering Negative 9.34% 39.15% 
18/12/2017 Germany Germany joins France for G-20 based cryptocurrency regulation Anti-money laundering Negative 5.79% 33.92% 
20/12/2017 UK Carney is not worried about the systemic risk of cryptocurrencies Issuance regulation Positive 2.60% 25.24% 
22/12/2017 Belarus Belarus creates a tax-free cryptocurrency hub Anti-money laundering Positive -14.33% 15.11% 
28/12/2017 South Korea South Korea: tightening of cryptocurrency regulation is expected Anti-money laundering Negative -5.41% 25.61% 
02/01/2018 Russia Russia considers a state-backed "cryptorouble" State-backed issuance Positive 9.80% 17.64% 
03/01/2018 China China will restrict electricity access to miners Risk concerns Negative 11.09% 18.75% 
05/01/2018 UK BoE clarifies it is not launching its own cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Negative 5.10% 38.22% 
09/01/2018 Venezuela Venezuela's parliament outlaws the sovereign cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Negative -0.79% 15.99% 
11/01/2018 South Korea South Korea considers ban on cryptocurrency trading Anti-money laundering Negative -9.06% 13.01% 
15/01/2018 China China banning cryptocurrency exchange substitutes Exchange regulation Negative -3.28% 9.78% 
15/01/2018 South Korea Regulators uncertain whether cryptocurrency exchanges should be banned Exchange regulation Positive -3.28% 9.78% 
16/01/2018 Russia Russia plans to let Bitcoin trade on official exchanges Exchange regulation Positive -20.82% 8.31% 
19/01/2018 Switzerland Switzerland encourages ICOs Issuance regulation Positive 0.76% 10.02% 
22/01/2018 South Korea Anonymous cryptocurrency trades banned Anti-money laundering Negative -5.04% 8.02% 
25/01/2018 Nigeria Nigeria's central bank warns against cryptocurrency risks Risk concerns Negative -0.42% 13.53% 
25/01/2018 UK May calls to look seriously into crypto due to money laundering concerns Anti-money laundering Negative -0.42% 13.53% 
29/01/2018 Japan Cryptocurrency exchange investigations after massive fraud Exchange regulation Negative -4.38% 12.70% 
30/01/2018 US Cryptocurrency advertisement ban on Facebook Issuance regulation Negative -11.53% 8.93% 
30/01/2018 US Bitfinex and Tether subpoenaed Exchange regulation Negative -11.53% 8.93% 
31/01/2018 South Korea Finance minister promises exchanges will not be banned Exchange regulation Positive 2.55% 7.88% 
31/01/2018 Hong Kong Hong Kong plans to regulate cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative 2.55% 7.88% 
01/02/2018 India India: money laundering concerns Anti-money laundering Negative -11.59% 7.22% 
05/02/2018 UK Virgin Money bans cryptocurrency purchases with its credit cards Anti-money laundering Negative -17.18% 6.86% 
05/02/2018 UK Lloyds bans cryptocurrency purchases Anti-money laundering Negative -17.18% 6.86% 
06/02/2018 Switzerland BIS: regulators might need to intervene into cryptocurrencies Risk concerns Negative 14.00% 10.26% 
08/02/2018 EU ECB calls for cryptocurrency regulation Anti-money laundering Negative 10.60% 7.75% 
13/02/2018 Japan Cryptocurrency traders sue Coincheck for cryptocurrency theft Anti-money laundering Negative -3.12% 6.61% 
13/02/2018 US Western Union tests transactions with Ripple Issuance regulation Positive -3.12% 6.61% 
16/02/2018 Switzerland Switzerland lays out "balanced approach" for ICO regulation Anti-money laundering Negative 1.44% 9.44% 
20/02/2018 Venezuela State-backed "Petro" cryptocurrency issued State-backed issuance Positive -2.57% 7.98% 
21/02/2018 UK MPs establish a committee for cryptocurrency investigation Anti-money laundering Negative -5.79% 6.48% 
21/02/2018 South Korea Regulators want the cryptocurrency industry to become self-regulated Exchange regulation Positive -5.79% 6.48% 
22/02/2018 France French regulators restrict cryptocurrency trading Anti-money laundering Negative -6.29% 6.77% 
27/02/2018 China China closing overseas cryptocurrency trading loopholes Anti-money laundering Negative 1.97% 6.59% 
28/02/2018 US SEC: Potentially fraudulent ICO issuers subpoenaed Issuance regulation Negative -3.81% 9.10% 
28/02/2018 Marshall Islands The Marshall Islands plans to issue SOV sovereign cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Positive -3.81% 9.10% 
01/03/2018 Japan Plans for self-regulatory authority for cryptocurrency exchanges  Exchange regulation Positive 4.31% 21.70% 
02/03/2018 UK Carney calls for regulation of cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative -0.37% 13.23% 
07/03/2018 Japan Business-improvement orders for Coincheck  Exchange regulation Negative -7.74% 12.70% 
07/03/2018 UK Bitcoin money laundering: Always Efficient LLP Anti-money laundering Negative -7.74% 12.70% 
08/03/2018 Japan Japan suspends trade on Bitstation and FSHO exchanges Exchange regulation Negative -5.91% 11.37% 
13/03/2018 US Cryptocurrency advertisement ban on Google Risk concerns Negative -0.26% 6.84% 
13/03/2018 Japan Japan plans to push G20 on AML regulation for cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative -0.26% 6.84% 
14/03/2018 US Crypto start-up founders convicted of fraud Anti-money laundering Negative -10.85% 6.02% 
16/03/2018 US Bitcoin mining banned in Pattsburgh Risk concerns Negative -0.24% 6.94% 
19/03/2018 US US bans transactions with Venezuela's sovereign cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Negative 7.16% 9.69% 
20/03/2018 US G20 countries agree to jointly monitor cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative 2.58% 7.75% 
22/03/2018 Japan Warning issued for Binance for operating without a license Exchange regulation Negative -2.72% 7.46% 
22/03/2018 France France creates a legal framework for ICOs Issuance regulation Negative -2.72% 7.46% 
26/03/2018 US Twitter bans cryptocurrency advertising Risk concerns Negative -4.90% 8.15% 
27/03/2018 US Fed sceptical of Bitcoin value, considers it highly speculative Risk concerns Negative -5.25% 11.60% 
05/04/2018 India RBI bans cryptocurrency purchases from bank accounts Anti-money laundering Negative 0.19% 5.60% 
05/04/2018 Japan Japan issues a blueprint of ICO rules  Issuance regulation Negative 0.19% 5.60% 
05/04/2018 Spain Spain investigates potential tax evasion in cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative 0.19% 5.60% 
17/04/2018 US Exchanges asked to provide information on internal controls Exchange regulation Negative -1.20% 9.19% 
22/04/2018 Iran Iranian Central bank bans cryptocurrency purchases from bank accounts Anti-money laundering Negative 0.52% 10.70% 
23/04/2018 US CFTC former chairman: XRP and Ether should be classified as securities Issuance regulation Negative 3.77% 10.45% 
27/04/2018 US Nasdaq and BoA CEOs call for crypto regulation as securities Issuance regulation Negative -2.95% 7.83% 
28/04/2018 Iran Iran developing a local experimental government-backed cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Positive 6.19% 10.48% 
24/05/2018 US Cryptocurrency price manipulation investigation Exchange regulation Negative 3.09% 8.22% 
01/06/2018 Estonia Estonia scales down the Estcoin project State-backed issuance Negative 0.84% 8.92% 
14/06/2018 US SEC: Bitcoin and Ethereum are not securities Issuance regulation Positive 6.76% 7.31% 
18/06/2018 France Macron promises looser regulation for crypto projects Issuance regulation Positive 3.23% 6.81% 
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22/06/2018 Japan Business-improvement orders for cryptocurrency exchanges Exchange regulation Negative -11.01% 6.30% 
26/06/2018 US Facebook eases the cryptocurrency advertising ban Risk concerns Positive -4.51% 6.74% 
12/07/2018 Malta Crypto investors plan to establish a regulated cryptocurrency bank Issuance regulation Positive -3.19% 4.72% 
19/07/2018 Switzerland Switzerland seeks to relax crypto regulations Anti-money laundering Positive -0.33% 5.84% 
26/07/2018 Iran Iran working on a state-backed cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Positive -2.69% 6.85% 
27/07/2018 US SEC rejects Bitcoin ETF proposal Issuance regulation Negative 2.02% 6.22% 
15/08/2018 US US cryptocurrency investor sues AT&T for cryptocurrency theft Anti-money laundering Negative 1.76% 8.37% 
22/08/2018 US SEC: Nine Bitcoin ETFs rejected Issuance regulation Negative -2.77% 6.55% 
23/08/2018 US Three Bitcoin ETF proposal rejected by SEC Issuance regulation Negative 2.85% 7.74% 
05/09/2018 EU Finance ministers: there should be common EU cryptocurrency regulation Anti-money laundering Negative -11.10% 10.89% 
11/09/2018 Marshall Islands The Marshall Islands are warned against issuing sovereign cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Negative -1.62% 9.31% 
11/09/2018 US SEC accuses three cryptocurrency projects of securities fraud Issuance regulation Negative -1.62% 9.31% 
18/09/2018 US NY: three crypto exchanges might be operating illegally Exchange regulation Negative 3.60% 7.05% 
19/09/2018 UK MPs call for crypto regulation, compare the market to "Wild West" Risk concerns Negative 0.39% 6.70% 
25/09/2018 US Google relaxes the cryptocurrency advertising ban for US and Japan Risk concerns Positive -1.66% 6.54% 
26/09/2018 Switzerland Former UBS bankers plan to establish a regulated cryptocurrency bank Issuance regulation Positive 0.75% 7.32% 
15/10/2018 US CFTC former chairman: most ICO tokens are securities Issuance regulation Negative 5.74% 9.33% 
19/10/2018 EU FATF proposed global cryptocurrency regulation for AML Anti-money laundering Negative -0.02% 6.67% 
24/10/2018 Japan Cryptocurrency exchange industry gets official self-regulatory status Exchange regulation Positive 0.02% 8.69% 
25/10/2018 UK UK government blocks the Royal Mint's cryptocurrency project State-backed issuance Negative -0.37% 8.73% 
29/10/2018 UK UK considers to ban cryptocurrency derivatives Issuance regulation Negative -3.34% 8.22% 
05/11/2018 Marshall Islands No confidence vote over sovereign cryptocurrency State-backed issuance Negative 1.21% 9.33% 
07/11/2018 France Bitcoin taxes lowered Risk concerns Positive -0.05% 12.30% 
14/11/2018 US Lagarde says central banks might issue their own digital currencies State-backed issuance Positive -10.29% 11.94% 
15/11/2018 EU Bitcoin is "a bubble, a Ponzi scheme and an environmental disaster" Risk concerns Negative -1.00% 24.22% 
17/11/2018 Switzerland Switzerland: first cryptocurrency-backed ETP Issuance regulation Positive 0.11% 5.95% 
19/11/2018 US SEC ordered ICO companies to register tokens and compensate investors Issuance regulation Negative -13.06% 7.13% 
14/12/2018 Marshall Islands Sovereign cryptocurrency project is delayed but continued State-backed issuance Positive -2.88% 6.36% 
07/01/2019 Japan FSA declines crypto futures but may legalise ETFs in the future Issuance regulation Negative -1.71% 9.14% 
14/02/2019 US JP Morgan creates first bank-backed cryptocurrency Issuance regulation Positive -0.79% 8.42% 
20/02/2019 Bahrain Bahrain plans to regulate cryptocurrencies Anti-money laundering Negative 2.23% 11.85% 
26/02/2019 Malta Malta develops a full crypto regulatory framework for ICOs Issuance regulation Negative -0.90% 7.01% 
 
Table 2. Regulatory events across event classes and jurisdictions. 
Country Anti-money laundering Exchange regulation Issuance regulation Risk concerns State-backed issuance Total % 
US 3 4 16 7 2 32 26.67% 
UK 8 0 2 3 2 15 12.50% 
Japan 2 8 2 0 0 12 10.00% 
South Korea 4 3 1 1 0 9 7.50% 
Russia 2 1 0 1 4 8 6.67% 
China 1 3 1 1 0 6 5.00% 
Switzerland 2 0 3 1 0 6 5.00% 
EU 3 0 0 1 0 4 3.33% 
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0 4 4 3.33% 
France 1 0 2 1 0 4 3.33% 
Iran 1 0 0 0 2 3 2.50% 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 3 3 2.50% 
India 2 0 0 0 0 2 1.67% 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 2 2 1.67% 
Malta 0 0 2 0 0 2 1.67% 
Bahrain 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Germany 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Belarus 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Spain 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Australia 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Hong Kong 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.83% 
Singapore 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.83% 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.83% 
Total 35 19 29 18 19 
120 
% 29.17% 15.83% 24.17% 15.00% 15.83% 
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The regulatory impact on cryptocurrency value is estimated in two frameworks: on an 
aggregated (market) level, using an equal-weighted and a value-weighted cryptocurrency 
market return index and on an individual cryptocurrency level, utilising a panel of 300 coin and 
token returns. Daily returns for the sample period from 1st January 2017 until 18th March 2019 
have been calculated using Coinmarketcap data and used to construct both the equal-weighted 
(simple average) and the value-weighted (market capitalisation weighted) cryptocurrency 
portfolios serving as market proxies on the first stage of the analysis. Both approaches code 
regulatory events using event class-specific dummy variables, 0 being no relevant event in the 
day of interest, 1 denoting a positive event and -1 denoting a negative event. All sample events 
and their theoretical impact on the regulatory environment of cryptocurrencies are presented in 
Table 1. As the events are identified and verified using reliable news sources, all 120 sample 
events are considered theoretically relevant, i.e., coded as +1 or -1. The definition of positive 
and negative regulatory change with regards to the five facets of cryptocurrency regulation can 
be consulted in greater detail in Data and Methodology section above.  
The market-wide impact of regulation is estimated in three time-series models: standard 
OLS regression, GARCH (1,1) model and AR model. The number of lags in the AR model is 
chosen based on the serial correlation properties identified with the regular LM test. To measure 
regulatory effect on individual coins, a panel data model is used, estimating a pooled regression, 
a Fixed Effects and a Random Effects model, each with ordinary, period-clustered seemingly 
unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962) and two-way clustered (Petersen, 2009) standard errors, as 
in Campbell et al. (2003) and Shanaev et al. (in press). To choose from three feasible panel data 
models, first the redundant Fixed Effects F-test is applied to determine whether pooled 
regression can be improved upon, and then Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is utilised to 
determine if the Random Effects estimators are consistent. 
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Tables 3a-3d and 4 below report the results of the estimations of time-series and panel 
data models, respectively. For the time-series models, GARCH (1,1) variance regressors were 
both statistically significant and economically meaningful (positive and summing up to less 
than 1). The LM test identified that the proper amount of lags for the AR model is two, and in 
the AR model, all the roots had an absolute value of less than unity. Therefore, the results of all 
three time-series models are interpretable. Next, as in Ciaian and Rajcaniova (2018), potential 
heterogeneities in cryptocurrency price responses across proof-of-work, proof-of-stake coins 
and tokens are studied. Consistently, for the equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios 
across proof-of-work coins, proof-of-stake coins, tokens and market as a whole, the 
development of issuance and anti-money laundering regulation generates a negative response 
in the cryptocurrency market index, while the relaxation of this regulation is associated with 
positive abnormal returns. Exchange regulation and state-backed issuance are significant or 
marginally insignificant in some estimations, particularly for proof-of-work coins, making it 
unclear whether the market reacts to those events, while cryptocurrency risk concerns and risk-
related policy propositions cause no market movements.  
Table 3a. Regulatory effect on cryptocurrency value on the aggregate (market) level.  
Regressor 
Equal-weighted portfolio Value-weighted portfolio 
OLS GARCH AR OLS GARCH AR 
Constant 
1.2914*** 1.0888*** 1.2964*** 0.6330*** 0.5598*** 0.6440*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Anti-money laundering 
1.9918* 2.3516*** 2.2071*** 2.0395** 2.0319*** 2.3461*** 
(0.0632) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0161) (0.0018) (0.0001) 
Exchange regulation 
1.2823 1.1030 0.9153 0.8148 0.9888 0.7585 
(0.3601) (0.1935) (0.3017) (0.4615) (0.1597) (0.2631) 
Issuance regulation 
2.6440** 2.4788*** 2.7646** 2.1937** 1.5703** 2.3321*** 
(0.0170) (0.0095) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0162) (0.0053) 
Risk concerns 
0.0252 0.6382 -0.1980 0.1075 0.3586 0.0014 
(0.9857) (0.5738) (0.8543) (0.9228) (0.6347) (0.9984) 
State-backed issuance 
-1.3800 -1.5222 -1.6560 -0.2860 -0.6420 -0.3610 
(0.3105) (0.2498) (0.1453) (0.7898) (0.3973) (0.7505) 
𝑅2  0.0129 0.0111 0.0267 0.0147 0.0136 0.0237 
 
Table 3b. Regulatory effect on cryptocurrency value for proof-of-work coins. 
Regressor Equal-weighted portfolio Value-weighted portfolio 
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OLS GARCH AR OLS GARCH AR 
Constant 
1.1288*** 0.8120*** 1.1131*** 0.4760*** 0.4780*** 0.4838*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0000) (0.0049) 
Anti-money laundering 
1.6239 1.3591* 1.7566** 1.9725** 2.0321*** 2.1670*** 
(0.1225) (0.0905) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Exchange regulation 
0.7537 1.2332 0.4671 0.7575 1.1700*** 0.7422 
(0.5833) (0.1886) (0.6098) (0.4763) (0.0024) (0.2837) 
Issuance regulation 
2.7519** 2.2727*** 2.8129*** 2.0113** 1.6902*** 2.0992** 
(0.0113) (0.0039) (0.0061) (0.0168) (0.0000) (0.0117) 
Risk concerns 
1.1472 1.5801* 0.9266 0.6718 0.2400 0.6480 
(0.4049) (0.0972) (0.3650) (0.5286) (0.5990) (0.3926) 
State-backed issuance 
-1.7407 -1.9653** -1.9547 -0.5841 -1.0618** -0.6965 
(0.1923) (0.0301) (0.1398) (0.5717) (0.0243) (0.4864) 
𝑅2  0.0138 0.0104 0.0216 0.0151 0.0143 0.0183 
 
Table 3c. Regulatory effect on cryptocurrency value for proof-of-stake coins. 
Regressor 
Equal-weighted portfolio Value-weighted portfolio 
OLS GARCH AR OLS GARCH AR 
Constant 
1.4316*** 1.1020** 1.4371*** 1.3173*** 0.8343** 1.3287*** 
(0.0000) (0.0136) (0.0070) (0.0033) (0.0121) (0.0006) 
Anti-money laundering 
2.2874 2.6591 2.4908* 1.5222 2.3221* 2.0165* 
(0.1407) (0.1001) (0.0930) (0.2646) (0.0695) (0.0522) 
Exchange regulation 
2.1125 1.7988 1.8261 0.9396 0.5302 0.2610 
(0.2979) (0.2284) (0.3225) (0.5984) (0.6893) (0.8444) 
Issuance regulation 
2.4141 2.1698 2.4952 2.9690** 2.8368** 3.1650** 
(0.1321) (0.2580) (0.2611) (0.0353) (0.0422) (0.0417) 
Risk concerns 
-0.7410 -0.2396 -0.8927 -0.3106 0.6329 -0.6684 
(0.7156) (0.9253) (0.7026) (0.8621) (0.6065) (0.5331) 
State-backed issuance 
-1.1127 -1.6672 -1.6268 -0.6048 -1.6489 -1.2603 
(0.5723) (0.5369) (0.6141) (0.7270) (0.2953) (0.4181) 
𝑅2  0.0069 0.0050 0.0216 0.0072 0.0011 0.0363 
 
Table 3d. Regulatory effect on cryptocurrency value for tokens. 
Regressor 
Equal-weighted portfolio Value-weighted portfolio 
OLS GARCH AR OLS GARCH AR 
Constant 
1.3675*** 1.2588*** 1.3719*** 1.2362*** 0.8510*** 1.2408*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Anti-money laundering 
2.1924 2.2443* 2.3080* 2.1877 2.2258** 2.3746** 
(0.1404) (0.0966) (0.0692) (0.1035) (0.0220) (0.0233) 
Exchange regulation 
0.7281 0.4748 0.4443 0.5310 1.1317 0.4720 
(0.7079) (0.7813) (0.7761) (0.7632) (0.3186) (0.7286) 
Issuance regulation 
2.7815* 2.9220** 2.9210 3.0082** 2.4082*** 3.0789** 
(0.0701) (0.0349) (0.1040) (0.0302) (0.0043) (0.0355) 
Risk concerns 
-0.0901 -0.3132 -0.0823 -0.6468 0.0042 -0.7732 
(0.9631) (0.8877) (0.9651) (0.7133) (0.9977) (0.5429) 
State-backed issuance 
-1.7474 -2.1036 -1.8986 -2.0952 -2.7496*** -2.0725 
(0.3547) (0.3085) (0.4203) (0.2194) (0.0018) (0.1816) 
𝑅2  0.0076 0.0073 0.0124 0.0106 0.0069 0.0154 
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Notes: in Tables 3a-3d, event class effect on cryptocurrency returns estimated in a time-series model using a dummy variable 
approach in standard OLS, GARCH (1,1) (Bollerslev, 1986) as well as AR models. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The same pattern is replicated in the panel data models, showing there is no significant 
heterogeneity bias in the aggregate treatment of the cryptocurrency market. As the redundant 
Fixed Effects F-test has generated significant F-statistic, cross-sectional dummy variables 
meaningfully contribute to the explanatory power of the model, and therefore the Fixed Effects 
model is preferable to the pooled regression model. Consequently, the Hausman test has 
produced an insignificant Chi-squared statistic, evidencing that Random Effects estimator is 
consistent and can be used instead of the less efficient Fixed Effects estimator. Therefore, the 
study mainly opts to interpret the Random Effects model output, however, note that the results 
are outstandingly consistent across all three models. To further test if responses to regulatory 
events are different for proof-of-work, proof-of-stake coins and tokens, an omitted variable F-
test was utilised to check if the addition of ten dummy interaction terms based on 
cryptocurrency type and event class significantly improve the model’s explanatory power. A 
highly insignificant F-stat of 0.098 (p-value greater than 99%) has been obtained, showing that 
cryptocurrency price responses to regulation do not depend on cryptocurrency type (proof-of-
work, proof-of-stake, coin with an unconventional consensus mechanism or token). 
Table 4. Regulatory effect on cryptocurrency value on the individual coin level.  
Regressor 











1.6593 1.6573 1.4600 
(0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0358) (0.0003) 
Anti-money 
laundering 
2.4956 2.4517 2.4561 
(0.0093) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0104) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0103) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Exchange 
regulation 
1.8392 1.7600 1.7760 
(0.1445) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1612) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1574) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Issuance 
regulation 
2.6748 2.6646 2.6655 
(0.0046) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0047) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0046) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Risk 
concerns 
-0.0740 -0.0640 -0.0680 
(0.9528) (0.7854) (0.8164) (0.9590) (0.8131) (0.7892) (0.9565) (0.8003) (0.8240) 
State-backed 
issuance 
-1.7830 -1.8320 -1.8230 
(0.1413) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1295) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1313) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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𝑅2 0.0001 0.0090 0.0001 
Notes: event class effect on cryptocurrency returns estimated in a panel data framework using a dummy variable approach. 
Standard errors are estimated using OLS, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach (Zellner, 1962) as well as two-way 
volatility clustering assumption (Petersen, 2009).  
 
In the estimation with robust heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, either from 
the seemingly unrelated regression model (Zellner, 1962) or with two-way volatility clustering 
(Petersen, 2009), four out of five regulation types are shown to significantly affect coin prices, 
anti-money laundering and issuance regulation again being most consistent.  
For anti-money laundering policies, the implementation of new anti-fraud controls or 
the overall tightening of the regulatory framework produces an average negative abnormal 
return of 2.46%. 
Regarding exchange regulation, the approval of new cryptocurrency exchanges and the 
generally hands-off regulatory framework contributes to the coin market prices positively, 
while active interventions such as business improvement orders, closures and legal 
investigations into the exchanges' operations are shown to reduce cryptocurrency value by 
1.78% on average. 
New issuance regulation measures, such as ICO bans, classification of cryptocurrencies 
as securities and rejections of cryptocurrency ETFs and ETPs generate an expected negative 
price response equalling  2.67%,  while approval of new cryptocurrency-related instruments, 
relaxation of ICO regulations and recognition of cryptocurrencies as not being subject to SEC 
authority triggers a similar positive response. 
Conversely, risk concerns and broad value judgements regarding cryptocurrencies 
publicly expressed by government officials are not priced on the cryptocurrency market at all, 
either positively or negatively, in any of the estimation frameworks. It might reflect the fact that 
the market does not believe cryptocurrencies are a potential systemic risk threat (Auer and 
Claessens, 2018).  
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Finally, optimistic news related to state-backed issuance of sovereign cryptocurrencies 
similarly decreases coin value by 1.82%, either due to expected complementarity between 
established cryptocurrencies and sovereign “challengers”, generally more intrusive government 
attitude towards the industry or negative publicity generated by some of the least credible 
sovereign cryptocurrencies such as Venezuelan so-called “Petro”. Contrastingly, the dismissals 
or discontinuations of state-backed cryptocurrency projects or heavy criticism addressed at 
them is evaluated positively by the market. 
Overall, the results signal that the market perceives regulatory events as value-
destroying, estimating efficiency and consumer value losses associated with the implementation 
of regulation higher than the potential reduction of risk and wider adoption. Therefore, the 
market implicitly prices current attempts regarding the development of cryptocurrency 
regulation as generally counterproductive.  
To determine if the cryptocurrency market is efficient regarding the reflection of 
regulatory factors and as an additional robustness check, the study also estimates abnormal 
returns for each of the days in the event window [-2;2] using the constant return model in the 
panel regression framework with Random effects. The constant return model has been chosen 
as regulatory events potentially affect all cryptocurrencies simultaneously, so, unlike in case of 
51% attacks (Shanaev et al., in press), there would be little reason to develop a cryptocurrency-
specific market factor for event studies purposes. As for other potential market factors, e.g., 
broad stock market indices, they are consistently shown to not influence crypto-asset returns 
(Lee et al., 2018; Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018; Liu et al., 2019), so their relevance for these 
estimations is doubtable at best. Table 5 below presents the estimation results.  












[-2;-2] -0.8290 1.5613 -1.2340 0.2367 0.3933 
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(0.3944) (0.2215) (0.1992) (0.8508) (0.7507) 
[-1;-1] 
-1.0440 0.7124 -0.2150 0.0037 -0.0190 
(0.2851) (0.6240) (0.8237) (0.9977) (0.9879) 
[0;0] 
2.4308** 2.1414* 3.0117*** -0.1040 -2.0620* 
(0.0128) (0.0977) (0.0018) (0.9346) (0.0962) 
[1;1] 
1.7902* 2.3501* -0.9770 1.1930 0.7270 
(0.0695) (0.0687) (0.3115) (0.3497) (0.5588) 
[2;2] 
-0.5750 -0.2020 0.8231 1.6539 1.4435 
(0.5594) (0.8753) (0.3940) (0.1941) (0.2394) 
Notes: abnormal cryptocurrency returns estimated in a panel data model with Random Effects using a dummy variable 
approach. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The findings are generally consistent with the output of Tables 3a-3d and 4. 
Interestingly, there is notable underreaction to the anti-money laundering and exchange 
regulation news, some significant price adjustments being observable one day after the event. 
Nevertheless, the coin price responses on the event days themselves remain statistically 
significant and of signs consistent with previous results. Apart from underreaction, such market 
inefficiency case can also be explained by the high uncertainty and relative unreliability of most 
cryptocurrency-related news. Therefore, the market might require additional time to check if 
the regulatory announcement is reliable and adjust the price accordingly. Notably, there exists 
no such tendency for either issuance regulation events or state-backed issuance events, 
potentially due to the fact that they are easier to verify. The study has not found any abnormal 
returns on days preceding the event, therefore evidencing no noticeable anticipation effects, 
general unpredictability of regulatory events and absence of insider trading by regulators.  
 
Conclusion 
This study has estimated the impact of five broad regulatory event classes on the cryptocurrency 
market, using manually collected data on 120 events and a sample of 300 coins and tokens on 
a daily basis. Having applied various event studies techniques in the time-series and panel data 
models, it has shown that news associated with the tightening and, generally, further 
development of anti-money laundering, exchange and issuance regulation as well as news on 
the successful launch of state-backed sovereign cryptocurrencies have a statistically and 
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economically significant negative effect on the market. Further, the relaxation of the respective 
policy measures and the declaration of hands-off, self-regulatory approach as well as rejections 
or heavy critiques of state-backed blockchain payment system projects, contrastingly, lead to 
coin prices appreciating. The results are extremely consistent for anti-money laundering and 
issuance regulation policies and rather consistent for exchange regulation and state-backed 
issuance. There is no evidence to suggest that the market is influenced either by the risk 
concerns of regulators or by government officials expressing their attitudes towards 
cryptocurrencies publicly. 
The findings concerning market efficiency are mixed. There are slight inefficiencies in 
the form of underreaction regarding the treatment of anti-money laundering and exchange 
regulation news, relevant information being reflected in the market price only on the following 
day. However, it might alternatively imply relative complexity of information verification. For 
issuance regulation and state-backed issuance, the significant price change occurs on the event 
day only, largely reaffirming the weak efficient market hypothesis for the cryptocurrency 
market.  Overall, the cryptocurrency market is shown to be more efficient in the treatment of 
technological factors such as 51% attacks (Shanaev et al., in press) rather than regulatory 
factors, explainable either by the higher uncertainty associated with the latter or, alternatively, 
by the specific expertise of cryptocurrency market participants.  The study has not found any 
anticipation effects prior to the regulatory events, simultaneously supporting that they are 
highly unpredictable and evidencing that regulators and other potentially knowledgeable parties 
do not participate in insider trading prior to the announcements to profit from the private 
information they possess.  
The findings of the study generally suggest that excessive regulation of cryptocurrencies 
is counterproductive, at least at the current stage of their development, and a hands-off, laissez-
faire or a “sandbox” attitude can prove itself more appropriate. As such, government 
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commitments not to overregulate cryptocurrencies and to let the industry develop in a freer 
environment can contribute to lower market volatility and more stable coin and token prices. 
This research also has significant implications for investors, as it shows the relevance 
of news analysis for the cryptocurrency markets, as traders can suffer significant losses if they 
do not account for regulatory events in their strategies. It has demonstrated that cryptocurrency 
price responses to these events are universal across all crypto-asset classes, implying that there 
is no “safe haven” from regulation on the cryptocurrency market, unlike in the case of 
macroeconomic (Corbet et al., 2017), macro-financial (Ciaian and Rajcaniova; 2018), and 
geopolitical (Aysan et al., 2019) factors.  
The limitations of the study are mainly associated with a short sample period and 
homogeneous treatment of regulatory events from each of the five identified groups. However, 
as the sample included both bullish and bearish sub-periods and as the estimation results were 
highly significant and consistent, these limitations are not expected to materially affect the sign 
and magnitude of the findings. Future research might investigate the relationship between 
cryptocurrency regulation and coin prices in a more heterogeneous manner, accounting for 
different regulatory events (for example, events originating in a different jurisdiction) having 
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